No vars found in this namespace.
This class creates server sockets. It may be subclassed by other factories, which create particular types of server sockets. This provides a general framework for the addition of public socket-level functionality. It is the server side analogue of a socket factory, and similarly provides a way to capture a variety of policies related to the sockets being constructed.
Like socket factories, server Socket factory instances have methods used to create sockets. There is also an environment specific default server socket factory; frameworks will often use their own customized factory.
This class creates server sockets. It may be subclassed by other factories, which create particular types of server sockets. This provides a general framework for the addition of public socket-level functionality. It is the server side analogue of a socket factory, and similarly provides a way to capture a variety of policies related to the sockets being constructed. Like socket factories, server Socket factory instances have methods used to create sockets. There is also an environment specific default server socket factory; frameworks will often use their own customized factory.
This class creates sockets. It may be subclassed by other factories, which create particular subclasses of sockets and thus provide a general framework for the addition of public socket-level functionality.
Socket factories are a simple way to capture a variety of policies related to the sockets being constructed, producing such sockets in a way which does not require special configuration of the code which asks for the sockets:
Due to polymorphism of both factories and sockets, different
kinds of sockets can be used by the same application code just
by passing it different kinds of factories.
Factories can themselves be customized with parameters used
in socket construction. So for example, factories could be
customized to return sockets with different networking timeouts
or security parameters already configured.
The sockets returned to the application can be subclasses
of java.net.Socket, so that they can directly expose new APIs
for features such as compression, security, record marking,
statistics collection, or firewall tunneling.
Factory classes are specified by environment-specific configuration mechanisms. For example, the getDefault method could return a factory that was appropriate for a particular user or applet, and a framework could use a factory customized to its own purposes.
This class creates sockets. It may be subclassed by other factories, which create particular subclasses of sockets and thus provide a general framework for the addition of public socket-level functionality. Socket factories are a simple way to capture a variety of policies related to the sockets being constructed, producing such sockets in a way which does not require special configuration of the code which asks for the sockets: Due to polymorphism of both factories and sockets, different kinds of sockets can be used by the same application code just by passing it different kinds of factories. Factories can themselves be customized with parameters used in socket construction. So for example, factories could be customized to return sockets with different networking timeouts or security parameters already configured. The sockets returned to the application can be subclasses of java.net.Socket, so that they can directly expose new APIs for features such as compression, security, record marking, statistics collection, or firewall tunneling. Factory classes are specified by environment-specific configuration mechanisms. For example, the getDefault method could return a factory that was appropriate for a particular user or applet, and a framework could use a factory customized to its own purposes.
A wrapper for CertPathParameters. This class is used to pass validation settings to CertPath based TrustManagers using the TrustManagerFactory.init() method.
Instances of this class are immutable.
A wrapper for CertPathParameters. This class is used to pass validation settings to CertPath based TrustManagers using the TrustManagerFactory.init() method. Instances of this class are immutable.
No vars found in this namespace.
Extends the SSLSession interface to support additional session attributes.
Extends the SSLSession interface to support additional session attributes.
This event indicates that an SSL handshake completed on a given SSL connection. All of the core information about that handshake's result is captured through an "SSLSession" object. As a convenience, this event class provides direct access to some important session attributes.
The source of this event is the SSLSocket on which handshaking just completed.
This event indicates that an SSL handshake completed on a given SSL connection. All of the core information about that handshake's result is captured through an "SSLSession" object. As a convenience, this event class provides direct access to some important session attributes. The source of this event is the SSLSocket on which handshaking just completed.
This interface is implemented by any class which wants to receive notifications about the completion of an SSL protocol handshake on a given SSL connection.
When an SSL handshake completes, new security parameters will have been established. Those parameters always include the security keys used to protect messages. They may also include parameters associated with a new session such as authenticated peer identity and a new SSL cipher suite.
This interface is implemented by any class which wants to receive notifications about the completion of an SSL protocol handshake on a given SSL connection. When an SSL handshake completes, new security parameters will have been established. Those parameters always include the security keys used to protect messages. They may also include parameters associated with a new session such as authenticated peer identity and a new SSL cipher suite.
This class is the base interface for hostname verification.
During handshaking, if the URL's hostname and the server's identification hostname mismatch, the verification mechanism can call back to implementers of this interface to determine if this connection should be allowed.
The policies can be certificate-based or may depend on other authentication schemes.
These callbacks are used when the default rules for URL hostname verification fail.
This class is the base interface for hostname verification. During handshaking, if the URL's hostname and the server's identification hostname mismatch, the verification mechanism can call back to implementers of this interface to determine if this connection should be allowed. The policies can be certificate-based or may depend on other authentication schemes. These callbacks are used when the default rules for URL hostname verification fail.
HttpsURLConnection extends HttpURLConnection with support for https-specific features.
See http://www.w3.org/pub/WWW/Protocols/ and RFC 2818 for more details on the https specification.
This class uses HostnameVerifier and SSLSocketFactory. There are default implementations defined for both classes. However, the implementations can be replaced on a per-class (static) or per-instance basis. All new HttpsURLConnections instances will be assigned the "default" static values at instance creation, but they can be overriden by calling the appropriate per-instance set method(s) before connecting.
HttpsURLConnection extends HttpURLConnection with support for https-specific features. See http://www.w3.org/pub/WWW/Protocols/ and RFC 2818 for more details on the https specification. This class uses HostnameVerifier and SSLSocketFactory. There are default implementations defined for both classes. However, the implementations can be replaced on a per-class (static) or per-instance basis. All new HttpsURLConnections instances will be assigned the "default" static values at instance creation, but they can be overriden by calling the appropriate per-instance set method(s) before connecting.
This is the base interface for JSSE key managers.
KeyManagers are responsible for managing the key material which is used to authenticate the local SSLSocket to its peer. If no key material is available, the socket will be unable to present authentication credentials.
KeyManagers are created by either using a KeyManagerFactory, or by implementing one of the KeyManager subclasses.
This is the base interface for JSSE key managers. KeyManagers are responsible for managing the key material which is used to authenticate the local SSLSocket to its peer. If no key material is available, the socket will be unable to present authentication credentials. KeyManagers are created by either using a KeyManagerFactory, or by implementing one of the KeyManager subclasses.
No vars found in this namespace.
This class acts as a factory for key managers based on a source of key material. Each key manager manages a specific type of key material for use by secure sockets. The key material is based on a KeyStore and/or provider specific sources.
This class acts as a factory for key managers based on a source of key material. Each key manager manages a specific type of key material for use by secure sockets. The key material is based on a KeyStore and/or provider specific sources.
This class defines the Service Provider Interface (SPI) for the KeyManagerFactory class.
All the abstract methods in this class must be implemented by each cryptographic service provider who wishes to supply the implementation of a particular key manager factory.
This class defines the Service Provider Interface (SPI) for the KeyManagerFactory class. All the abstract methods in this class must be implemented by each cryptographic service provider who wishes to supply the implementation of a particular key manager factory.
A parameters object for X509KeyManagers that encapsulates a List of KeyStore.Builders.
A parameters object for X509KeyManagers that encapsulates a List of KeyStore.Builders.
This class is the base interface for providing algorithm-specific information to a KeyManagerFactory or TrustManagerFactory.
In some cases, initialization parameters other than keystores may be needed by a provider. Users of that particular provider are expected to pass an implementation of the appropriate sub-interface of this class as defined by the provider. The provider can then call the specified methods in the ManagerFactoryParameters implementation to obtain the needed information.
This class is the base interface for providing algorithm-specific information to a KeyManagerFactory or TrustManagerFactory. In some cases, initialization parameters other than keystores may be needed by a provider. Users of that particular provider are expected to pass an implementation of the appropriate sub-interface of this class as defined by the provider. The provider can then call the specified methods in the ManagerFactoryParameters implementation to obtain the needed information.
No vars found in this namespace.
Instances of this class represent a server name of type host_name in a Server Name Indication (SNI) extension.
As described in section 3, "Server Name Indication", of TLS Extensions (RFC 6066), "HostName" contains the fully qualified DNS hostname of the server, as understood by the client. The encoded server name value of a hostname is represented as a byte string using ASCII encoding without a trailing dot. This allows the support of Internationalized Domain Names (IDN) through the use of A-labels (the ASCII-Compatible Encoding (ACE) form of a valid string of Internationalized Domain Names for Applications (IDNA)) defined in RFC 5890.
Note that SNIHostName objects are immutable.
Instances of this class represent a server name of type host_name in a Server Name Indication (SNI) extension. As described in section 3, "Server Name Indication", of TLS Extensions (RFC 6066), "HostName" contains the fully qualified DNS hostname of the server, as understood by the client. The encoded server name value of a hostname is represented as a byte string using ASCII encoding without a trailing dot. This allows the support of Internationalized Domain Names (IDN) through the use of A-labels (the ASCII-Compatible Encoding (ACE) form of a valid string of Internationalized Domain Names for Applications (IDNA)) defined in RFC 5890. Note that SNIHostName objects are immutable.
Instances of this class represent a matcher that performs match operations on an SNIServerName instance.
Servers can use Server Name Indication (SNI) information to decide if specific SSLSocket or SSLEngine instances should accept a connection. For example, when multiple "virtual" or "name-based" servers are hosted on a single underlying network address, the server application can use SNI information to determine whether this server is the exact server that the client wants to access. Instances of this class can be used by a server to verify the acceptable server names of a particular type, such as host names.
SNIMatcher objects are immutable. Subclasses should not provide methods that can change the state of an instance once it has been created.
Instances of this class represent a matcher that performs match operations on an SNIServerName instance. Servers can use Server Name Indication (SNI) information to decide if specific SSLSocket or SSLEngine instances should accept a connection. For example, when multiple "virtual" or "name-based" servers are hosted on a single underlying network address, the server application can use SNI information to determine whether this server is the exact server that the client wants to access. Instances of this class can be used by a server to verify the acceptable server names of a particular type, such as host names. SNIMatcher objects are immutable. Subclasses should not provide methods that can change the state of an instance once it has been created.
Instances of this class represent a server name in a Server Name Indication (SNI) extension.
The SNI extension is a feature that extends the SSL/TLS protocols to indicate what server name the client is attempting to connect to during handshaking. See section 3, "Server Name Indication", of TLS Extensions (RFC 6066).
SNIServerName objects are immutable. Subclasses should not provide methods that can change the state of an instance once it has been created.
Instances of this class represent a server name in a Server Name Indication (SNI) extension. The SNI extension is a feature that extends the SSL/TLS protocols to indicate what server name the client is attempting to connect to during handshaking. See section 3, "Server Name Indication", of TLS Extensions (RFC 6066). SNIServerName objects are immutable. Subclasses should not provide methods that can change the state of an instance once it has been created.
Instances of this class represent a secure socket protocol implementation which acts as a factory for secure socket factories or SSLEngines. This class is initialized with an optional set of key and trust managers and source of secure random bytes.
Every implementation of the Java platform is required to support the following standard SSLContext protocol:
TLSv1
This protocol is described in the SSLContext section of the Java Cryptography Architecture Standard Algorithm Name Documentation. Consult the release documentation for your implementation to see if any other algorithms are supported.
Instances of this class represent a secure socket protocol implementation which acts as a factory for secure socket factories or SSLEngines. This class is initialized with an optional set of key and trust managers and source of secure random bytes. Every implementation of the Java platform is required to support the following standard SSLContext protocol: TLSv1 This protocol is described in the SSLContext section of the Java Cryptography Architecture Standard Algorithm Name Documentation. Consult the release documentation for your implementation to see if any other algorithms are supported.
This class defines the Service Provider Interface (SPI) for the SSLContext class.
All the abstract methods in this class must be implemented by each cryptographic service provider who wishes to supply the implementation of a particular SSL context.
This class defines the Service Provider Interface (SPI) for the SSLContext class. All the abstract methods in this class must be implemented by each cryptographic service provider who wishes to supply the implementation of a particular SSL context.
A class which enables secure communications using protocols such as the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) or IETF RFC 2246 "Transport Layer Security" (TLS) protocols, but is transport independent.
The secure communications modes include:
Integrity Protection. SSL/TLS protects against
modification of messages by an active wiretapper.
Authentication. In most modes, SSL/TLS provides
peer authentication. Servers are usually authenticated, and
clients may be authenticated as requested by servers.
Confidentiality (Privacy Protection). In most
modes, SSL/TLS encrypts data being sent between client and
server. This protects the confidentiality of data, so that
passive wiretappers won't see sensitive data such as financial
information or personal information of many kinds.
These kinds of protection are specified by a "cipher suite", which is a combination of cryptographic algorithms used by a given SSL connection. During the negotiation process, the two endpoints must agree on a cipher suite that is available in both environments. If there is no such suite in common, no SSL connection can be established, and no data can be exchanged.
The cipher suite used is established by a negotiation process called "handshaking". The goal of this process is to create or rejoin a "session", which may protect many connections over time. After handshaking has completed, you can access session attributes by using the getSession() method.
The SSLSocket class provides much of the same security functionality, but all of the inbound and outbound data is automatically transported using the underlying Socket, which by design uses a blocking model. While this is appropriate for many applications, this model does not provide the scalability required by large servers.
The primary distinction of an SSLEngine is that it operates on inbound and outbound byte streams, independent of the transport mechanism. It is the responsibility of the SSLEngine user to arrange for reliable I/O transport to the peer. By separating the SSL/TLS abstraction from the I/O transport mechanism, the SSLEngine can be used for a wide variety of I/O types, such as non-blocking I/O (polling), selectable non-blocking I/O, Socket and the traditional Input/OutputStreams, local ByteBuffers or byte arrays, future asynchronous I/O models , and so on.
At a high level, the SSLEngine appears thus:
app data
| ^
| | |
v | |
----+-----|-----+----+
| | |
| SSL|Engine |
wrap() | | | unwrap() | OUTBOUND | INBOUND | | | | ----+-----|-----+----+ | | ^ | | | v |
net data
Application data (also known as plaintext or cleartext) is data which is produced or consumed by an application. Its counterpart is network data, which consists of either handshaking and/or ciphertext (encrypted) data, and destined to be transported via an I/O mechanism. Inbound data is data which has been received from the peer, and outbound data is destined for the peer.
(In the context of an SSLEngine, the term "handshake data" is taken to mean any data exchanged to establish and control a secure connection. Handshake data includes the SSL/TLS messages "alert", "change_cipher_spec," and "handshake.")
There are five distinct phases to an SSLEngine.
Creation - The SSLEngine has been created and
initialized, but has not yet been used. During this phase, an
application may set any SSLEngine-specific settings
(enabled cipher suites, whether the SSLEngine should
handshake in client or server mode, and so on). Once
handshaking has begun, though, any new settings (except
client/server mode, see below) will be used for
the next handshake.
Initial Handshake - The initial handshake is a procedure by
which the two peers exchange communication parameters until an
SSLSession is established. Application data can not be sent during
this phase.
Application Data - Once the communication parameters have
been established and the handshake is complete, application data
may flow through the SSLEngine. Outbound
application messages are encrypted and integrity protected,
and inbound messages reverse the process.
Rehandshaking - Either side may request a renegotiation of
the session at any time during the Application Data phase. New
handshaking data can be intermixed among the application data.
Before starting the rehandshake phase, the application may
reset the SSL/TLS communication parameters such as the list of
enabled ciphersuites and whether to use client authentication,
but can not change between client/server modes. As before, once
handshaking has begun, any new SSLEngine
configuration settings will not be used until the next
handshake.
Closure - When the connection is no longer needed, the
application should close the SSLEngine and should
send/receive any remaining messages to the peer before
closing the underlying transport mechanism. Once an engine is
closed, it is not reusable: a new SSLEngine must
be created.
An SSLEngine is created by calling SSLContext.createSSLEngine() from an initialized SSLContext. Any configuration parameters should be set before making the first call to wrap(), unwrap(), or beginHandshake(). These methods all trigger the initial handshake.
Data moves through the engine by calling wrap() or unwrap() on outbound or inbound data, respectively. Depending on the state of the SSLEngine, a wrap() call may consume application data from the source buffer and may produce network data in the destination buffer. The outbound data may contain application and/or handshake data. A call to unwrap() will examine the source buffer and may advance the handshake if the data is handshaking information, or may place application data in the destination buffer if the data is application. The state of the underlying SSL/TLS algorithm will determine when data is consumed and produced.
Calls to wrap() and unwrap() return an SSLEngineResult which indicates the status of the operation, and (optionally) how to interact with the engine to make progress.
The SSLEngine produces/consumes complete SSL/TLS packets only, and does not store application data internally between calls to wrap()/unwrap(). Thus input and output ByteBuffers must be sized appropriately to hold the maximum record that can be produced. Calls to SSLSession.getPacketBufferSize() and SSLSession.getApplicationBufferSize() should be used to determine the appropriate buffer sizes. The size of the outbound application data buffer generally does not matter. If buffer conditions do not allow for the proper consumption/production of data, the application must determine (via SSLEngineResult) and correct the problem, and then try the call again.
For example, unwrap() will return a SSLEngineResult.Status.BUFFER_OVERFLOW result if the engine determines that there is not enough destination buffer space available. Applications should call SSLSession.getApplicationBufferSize() and compare that value with the space available in the destination buffer, enlarging the buffer if necessary. Similarly, if unwrap() were to return a SSLEngineResult.Status.BUFFER_UNDERFLOW, the application should call SSLSession.getPacketBufferSize() to ensure that the source buffer has enough room to hold a record (enlarging if necessary), and then obtain more inbound data.
SSLEngineResult r = engine.unwrap(src, dst); switch (r.getStatus()) { BUFFER_OVERFLOW: // Could attempt to drain the dst buffer of any already obtained // data, but we'll just increase it to the size needed. int appSize = engine.getSession().getApplicationBufferSize(); ByteBuffer b = ByteBuffer.allocate(appSize dst.position()); dst.flip(); b.put(dst); dst = b; // retry the operation. break; BUFFER_UNDERFLOW: int netSize = engine.getSession().getPacketBufferSize(); // Resize buffer if needed. if (netSize > dst.capacity()) { ByteBuffer b = ByteBuffer.allocate(netSize); src.flip(); b.put(src); src = b; } // Obtain more inbound network data for src, // then retry the operation. break; // other cases: CLOSED, OK. }
Unlike SSLSocket, all methods of SSLEngine are non-blocking. SSLEngine implementations may require the results of tasks that may take an extended period of time to complete, or may even block. For example, a TrustManager may need to connect to a remote certificate validation service, or a KeyManager might need to prompt a user to determine which certificate to use as part of client authentication. Additionally, creating cryptographic signatures and verifying them can be slow, seemingly blocking.
For any operation which may potentially block, the SSLEngine will create a Runnable delegated task. When SSLEngineResult indicates that a delegated task result is needed, the application must call getDelegatedTask() to obtain an outstanding delegated task and call its run() method (possibly using a different thread depending on the compute strategy). The application should continue obtaining delegated tasks until no more exist, and try the original operation again.
At the end of a communication session, applications should properly close the SSL/TLS link. The SSL/TLS protocols have closure handshake messages, and these messages should be communicated to the peer before releasing the SSLEngine and closing the underlying transport mechanism. A close can be initiated by one of: an SSLException, an inbound closure handshake message, or one of the close methods. In all cases, closure handshake messages are generated by the engine, and wrap() should be repeatedly called until the resulting SSLEngineResult's status returns "CLOSED", or isOutboundDone() returns true. All data obtained from the wrap() method should be sent to the peer.
closeOutbound() is used to signal the engine that the application will not be sending any more data.
A peer will signal its intent to close by sending its own closure handshake message. After this message has been received and processed by the local SSLEngine's unwrap() call, the application can detect the close by calling unwrap() and looking for a SSLEngineResult with status "CLOSED", or if isInboundDone() returns true. If for some reason the peer closes the communication link without sending the proper SSL/TLS closure message, the application can detect the end-of-stream and can signal the engine via closeInbound() that there will no more inbound messages to process. Some applications might choose to require orderly shutdown messages from a peer, in which case they can check that the closure was generated by a handshake message and not by an end-of-stream condition.
There are two groups of cipher suites which you will need to know about when managing cipher suites:
Supported cipher suites: all the suites which are
supported by the SSL implementation. This list is reported
using getSupportedCipherSuites().
Enabled cipher suites, which may be fewer than
the full set of supported suites. This group is set using the
setEnabledCipherSuites(String []) method, and
queried using the getEnabledCipherSuites() method.
Initially, a default set of cipher suites will be enabled on a
new engine that represents the minimum suggested
configuration.
Implementation defaults require that only cipher suites which authenticate servers and provide confidentiality be enabled by default. Only if both sides explicitly agree to unauthenticated and/or non-private (unencrypted) communications will such a cipher suite be selected.
Each SSL/TLS connection must have one client and one server, thus each endpoint must decide which role to assume. This choice determines who begins the handshaking process as well as which type of messages should be sent by each party. The method setUseClientMode(boolean) configures the mode. Once the initial handshaking has started, an SSLEngine can not switch between client and server modes, even when performing renegotiations.
Applications might choose to process delegated tasks in different threads. When an SSLEngine is created, the current AccessControlContext is saved. All future delegated tasks will be processed using this context: that is, all access control decisions will be made using the context captured at engine creation.
Concurrency Notes: There are two concurrency issues to be aware of:
The wrap() and unwrap() methods
may execute concurrently of each other.
The SSL/TLS protocols employ ordered packets.
Applications must take care to ensure that generated packets
are delivered in sequence. If packets arrive
out-of-order, unexpected or fatal results may occur.
For example:
synchronized (outboundLock) {
sslEngine.wrap(src, dst);
outboundQueue.put(dst);
}
As a corollary, two threads must not attempt to call the same method
(either wrap() or unwrap()) concurrently,
because there is no way to guarantee the eventual packet ordering.
A class which enables secure communications using protocols such as the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) or IETF RFC 2246 "Transport Layer Security" (TLS) protocols, but is transport independent. The secure communications modes include: Integrity Protection. SSL/TLS protects against modification of messages by an active wiretapper. Authentication. In most modes, SSL/TLS provides peer authentication. Servers are usually authenticated, and clients may be authenticated as requested by servers. Confidentiality (Privacy Protection). In most modes, SSL/TLS encrypts data being sent between client and server. This protects the confidentiality of data, so that passive wiretappers won't see sensitive data such as financial information or personal information of many kinds. These kinds of protection are specified by a "cipher suite", which is a combination of cryptographic algorithms used by a given SSL connection. During the negotiation process, the two endpoints must agree on a cipher suite that is available in both environments. If there is no such suite in common, no SSL connection can be established, and no data can be exchanged. The cipher suite used is established by a negotiation process called "handshaking". The goal of this process is to create or rejoin a "session", which may protect many connections over time. After handshaking has completed, you can access session attributes by using the getSession() method. The SSLSocket class provides much of the same security functionality, but all of the inbound and outbound data is automatically transported using the underlying Socket, which by design uses a blocking model. While this is appropriate for many applications, this model does not provide the scalability required by large servers. The primary distinction of an SSLEngine is that it operates on inbound and outbound byte streams, independent of the transport mechanism. It is the responsibility of the SSLEngine user to arrange for reliable I/O transport to the peer. By separating the SSL/TLS abstraction from the I/O transport mechanism, the SSLEngine can be used for a wide variety of I/O types, such as non-blocking I/O (polling), selectable non-blocking I/O, Socket and the traditional Input/OutputStreams, local ByteBuffers or byte arrays, future asynchronous I/O models , and so on. At a high level, the SSLEngine appears thus: app data | ^ | | | v | | ----+-----|-----+----+ | | | | SSL|Engine | wrap() | | | unwrap() | OUTBOUND | INBOUND | | | | ----+-----|-----+----+ | | ^ | | | v | net data Application data (also known as plaintext or cleartext) is data which is produced or consumed by an application. Its counterpart is network data, which consists of either handshaking and/or ciphertext (encrypted) data, and destined to be transported via an I/O mechanism. Inbound data is data which has been received from the peer, and outbound data is destined for the peer. (In the context of an SSLEngine, the term "handshake data" is taken to mean any data exchanged to establish and control a secure connection. Handshake data includes the SSL/TLS messages "alert", "change_cipher_spec," and "handshake.") There are five distinct phases to an SSLEngine. Creation - The SSLEngine has been created and initialized, but has not yet been used. During this phase, an application may set any SSLEngine-specific settings (enabled cipher suites, whether the SSLEngine should handshake in client or server mode, and so on). Once handshaking has begun, though, any new settings (except client/server mode, see below) will be used for the next handshake. Initial Handshake - The initial handshake is a procedure by which the two peers exchange communication parameters until an SSLSession is established. Application data can not be sent during this phase. Application Data - Once the communication parameters have been established and the handshake is complete, application data may flow through the SSLEngine. Outbound application messages are encrypted and integrity protected, and inbound messages reverse the process. Rehandshaking - Either side may request a renegotiation of the session at any time during the Application Data phase. New handshaking data can be intermixed among the application data. Before starting the rehandshake phase, the application may reset the SSL/TLS communication parameters such as the list of enabled ciphersuites and whether to use client authentication, but can not change between client/server modes. As before, once handshaking has begun, any new SSLEngine configuration settings will not be used until the next handshake. Closure - When the connection is no longer needed, the application should close the SSLEngine and should send/receive any remaining messages to the peer before closing the underlying transport mechanism. Once an engine is closed, it is not reusable: a new SSLEngine must be created. An SSLEngine is created by calling SSLContext.createSSLEngine() from an initialized SSLContext. Any configuration parameters should be set before making the first call to wrap(), unwrap(), or beginHandshake(). These methods all trigger the initial handshake. Data moves through the engine by calling wrap() or unwrap() on outbound or inbound data, respectively. Depending on the state of the SSLEngine, a wrap() call may consume application data from the source buffer and may produce network data in the destination buffer. The outbound data may contain application and/or handshake data. A call to unwrap() will examine the source buffer and may advance the handshake if the data is handshaking information, or may place application data in the destination buffer if the data is application. The state of the underlying SSL/TLS algorithm will determine when data is consumed and produced. Calls to wrap() and unwrap() return an SSLEngineResult which indicates the status of the operation, and (optionally) how to interact with the engine to make progress. The SSLEngine produces/consumes complete SSL/TLS packets only, and does not store application data internally between calls to wrap()/unwrap(). Thus input and output ByteBuffers must be sized appropriately to hold the maximum record that can be produced. Calls to SSLSession.getPacketBufferSize() and SSLSession.getApplicationBufferSize() should be used to determine the appropriate buffer sizes. The size of the outbound application data buffer generally does not matter. If buffer conditions do not allow for the proper consumption/production of data, the application must determine (via SSLEngineResult) and correct the problem, and then try the call again. For example, unwrap() will return a SSLEngineResult.Status.BUFFER_OVERFLOW result if the engine determines that there is not enough destination buffer space available. Applications should call SSLSession.getApplicationBufferSize() and compare that value with the space available in the destination buffer, enlarging the buffer if necessary. Similarly, if unwrap() were to return a SSLEngineResult.Status.BUFFER_UNDERFLOW, the application should call SSLSession.getPacketBufferSize() to ensure that the source buffer has enough room to hold a record (enlarging if necessary), and then obtain more inbound data. SSLEngineResult r = engine.unwrap(src, dst); switch (r.getStatus()) { BUFFER_OVERFLOW: // Could attempt to drain the dst buffer of any already obtained // data, but we'll just increase it to the size needed. int appSize = engine.getSession().getApplicationBufferSize(); ByteBuffer b = ByteBuffer.allocate(appSize dst.position()); dst.flip(); b.put(dst); dst = b; // retry the operation. break; BUFFER_UNDERFLOW: int netSize = engine.getSession().getPacketBufferSize(); // Resize buffer if needed. if (netSize > dst.capacity()) { ByteBuffer b = ByteBuffer.allocate(netSize); src.flip(); b.put(src); src = b; } // Obtain more inbound network data for src, // then retry the operation. break; // other cases: CLOSED, OK. } Unlike SSLSocket, all methods of SSLEngine are non-blocking. SSLEngine implementations may require the results of tasks that may take an extended period of time to complete, or may even block. For example, a TrustManager may need to connect to a remote certificate validation service, or a KeyManager might need to prompt a user to determine which certificate to use as part of client authentication. Additionally, creating cryptographic signatures and verifying them can be slow, seemingly blocking. For any operation which may potentially block, the SSLEngine will create a Runnable delegated task. When SSLEngineResult indicates that a delegated task result is needed, the application must call getDelegatedTask() to obtain an outstanding delegated task and call its run() method (possibly using a different thread depending on the compute strategy). The application should continue obtaining delegated tasks until no more exist, and try the original operation again. At the end of a communication session, applications should properly close the SSL/TLS link. The SSL/TLS protocols have closure handshake messages, and these messages should be communicated to the peer before releasing the SSLEngine and closing the underlying transport mechanism. A close can be initiated by one of: an SSLException, an inbound closure handshake message, or one of the close methods. In all cases, closure handshake messages are generated by the engine, and wrap() should be repeatedly called until the resulting SSLEngineResult's status returns "CLOSED", or isOutboundDone() returns true. All data obtained from the wrap() method should be sent to the peer. closeOutbound() is used to signal the engine that the application will not be sending any more data. A peer will signal its intent to close by sending its own closure handshake message. After this message has been received and processed by the local SSLEngine's unwrap() call, the application can detect the close by calling unwrap() and looking for a SSLEngineResult with status "CLOSED", or if isInboundDone() returns true. If for some reason the peer closes the communication link without sending the proper SSL/TLS closure message, the application can detect the end-of-stream and can signal the engine via closeInbound() that there will no more inbound messages to process. Some applications might choose to require orderly shutdown messages from a peer, in which case they can check that the closure was generated by a handshake message and not by an end-of-stream condition. There are two groups of cipher suites which you will need to know about when managing cipher suites: Supported cipher suites: all the suites which are supported by the SSL implementation. This list is reported using getSupportedCipherSuites(). Enabled cipher suites, which may be fewer than the full set of supported suites. This group is set using the setEnabledCipherSuites(String []) method, and queried using the getEnabledCipherSuites() method. Initially, a default set of cipher suites will be enabled on a new engine that represents the minimum suggested configuration. Implementation defaults require that only cipher suites which authenticate servers and provide confidentiality be enabled by default. Only if both sides explicitly agree to unauthenticated and/or non-private (unencrypted) communications will such a cipher suite be selected. Each SSL/TLS connection must have one client and one server, thus each endpoint must decide which role to assume. This choice determines who begins the handshaking process as well as which type of messages should be sent by each party. The method setUseClientMode(boolean) configures the mode. Once the initial handshaking has started, an SSLEngine can not switch between client and server modes, even when performing renegotiations. Applications might choose to process delegated tasks in different threads. When an SSLEngine is created, the current AccessControlContext is saved. All future delegated tasks will be processed using this context: that is, all access control decisions will be made using the context captured at engine creation. Concurrency Notes: There are two concurrency issues to be aware of: The wrap() and unwrap() methods may execute concurrently of each other. The SSL/TLS protocols employ ordered packets. Applications must take care to ensure that generated packets are delivered in sequence. If packets arrive out-of-order, unexpected or fatal results may occur. For example: synchronized (outboundLock) { sslEngine.wrap(src, dst); outboundQueue.put(dst); } As a corollary, two threads must not attempt to call the same method (either wrap() or unwrap()) concurrently, because there is no way to guarantee the eventual packet ordering.
An encapsulation of the result state produced by SSLEngine I/O calls.
A SSLEngine provides a means for establishing secure communication sessions between two peers. SSLEngine operations typically consume bytes from an input buffer and produce bytes in an output buffer. This class provides operational result values describing the state of the SSLEngine, including indications of what operations are needed to finish an ongoing handshake. Lastly, it reports the number of bytes consumed and produced as a result of this operation.
An encapsulation of the result state produced by SSLEngine I/O calls. A SSLEngine provides a means for establishing secure communication sessions between two peers. SSLEngine operations typically consume bytes from an input buffer and produce bytes in an output buffer. This class provides operational result values describing the state of the SSLEngine, including indications of what operations are needed to finish an ongoing handshake. Lastly, it reports the number of bytes consumed and produced as a result of this operation.
Indicates some kind of error detected by an SSL subsystem. This class is the general class of exceptions produced by failed SSL-related operations.
Indicates some kind of error detected by an SSL subsystem. This class is the general class of exceptions produced by failed SSL-related operations.
Indicates that the client and server could not negotiate the desired level of security. The connection is no longer usable.
Indicates that the client and server could not negotiate the desired level of security. The connection is no longer usable.
Reports a bad SSL key. Normally, this indicates misconfiguration of the server or client SSL certificate and private key.
Reports a bad SSL key. Normally, this indicates misconfiguration of the server or client SSL certificate and private key.
Encapsulates parameters for an SSL/TLS connection. The parameters are the list of ciphersuites to be accepted in an SSL/TLS handshake, the list of protocols to be allowed, the endpoint identification algorithm during SSL/TLS handshaking, the Server Name Indication (SNI), the algorithm constraints and whether SSL/TLS servers should request or require client authentication, etc.
SSLParameters can be created via the constructors in this class. Objects can also be obtained using the getSSLParameters() methods in SSLSocket and SSLServerSocket and SSLEngine or the getDefaultSSLParameters() and getSupportedSSLParameters() methods in SSLContext.
SSLParameters can be applied to a connection via the methods SSLSocket.setSSLParameters() and SSLServerSocket.setSSLParameters() and SSLEngine.setSSLParameters().
Encapsulates parameters for an SSL/TLS connection. The parameters are the list of ciphersuites to be accepted in an SSL/TLS handshake, the list of protocols to be allowed, the endpoint identification algorithm during SSL/TLS handshaking, the Server Name Indication (SNI), the algorithm constraints and whether SSL/TLS servers should request or require client authentication, etc. SSLParameters can be created via the constructors in this class. Objects can also be obtained using the getSSLParameters() methods in SSLSocket and SSLServerSocket and SSLEngine or the getDefaultSSLParameters() and getSupportedSSLParameters() methods in SSLContext. SSLParameters can be applied to a connection via the methods SSLSocket.setSSLParameters() and SSLServerSocket.setSSLParameters() and SSLEngine.setSSLParameters().
Indicates that the peer's identity has not been verified.
When the peer was not able to identify itself (for example; no certificate, the particular cipher suite being used does not support authentication, or no peer authentication was established during SSL handshaking) this exception is thrown.
Indicates that the peer's identity has not been verified. When the peer was not able to identify itself (for example; no certificate, the particular cipher suite being used does not support authentication, or no peer authentication was established during SSL handshaking) this exception is thrown.
This class is for various network permissions. An SSLPermission contains a name (also referred to as a "target name") but no actions list; you either have the named permission or you don't.
The target name is the name of the network permission (see below). The naming convention follows the hierarchical property naming convention. Also, an asterisk may appear at the end of the name, following a ".", or by itself, to signify a wildcard match. For example: "foo." and "" signify a wildcard match, while "foo" and "ab" do not.
The following table lists all the possible SSLPermission target names, and for each provides a description of what the permission allows and a discussion of the risks of granting code the permission.
Permission Target Name What the Permission Allows Risks of Allowing this Permission
setHostnameVerifier The ability to set a callback which can decide whether to allow a mismatch between the host being connected to by an HttpsURLConnection and the common name field in server certificate.
Malicious code can set a verifier that monitors host names visited by HttpsURLConnection requests or that allows server certificates with invalid common names.
getSSLSessionContext The ability to get the SSLSessionContext of an SSLSession.
Malicious code may monitor sessions which have been established with SSL peers or might invalidate sessions to slow down performance.
setDefaultSSLContext The ability to set the default SSL context
Malicious code can set a context that monitors the opening of connections or the plaintext data that is transmitted.
This class is for various network permissions. An SSLPermission contains a name (also referred to as a "target name") but no actions list; you either have the named permission or you don't. The target name is the name of the network permission (see below). The naming convention follows the hierarchical property naming convention. Also, an asterisk may appear at the end of the name, following a ".", or by itself, to signify a wildcard match. For example: "foo.*" and "*" signify a wildcard match, while "*foo" and "a*b" do not. The following table lists all the possible SSLPermission target names, and for each provides a description of what the permission allows and a discussion of the risks of granting code the permission. Permission Target Name What the Permission Allows Risks of Allowing this Permission setHostnameVerifier The ability to set a callback which can decide whether to allow a mismatch between the host being connected to by an HttpsURLConnection and the common name field in server certificate. Malicious code can set a verifier that monitors host names visited by HttpsURLConnection requests or that allows server certificates with invalid common names. getSSLSessionContext The ability to get the SSLSessionContext of an SSLSession. Malicious code may monitor sessions which have been established with SSL peers or might invalidate sessions to slow down performance. setDefaultSSLContext The ability to set the default SSL context Malicious code can set a context that monitors the opening of connections or the plaintext data that is transmitted.
Reports an error in the operation of the SSL protocol. Normally this indicates a flaw in one of the protocol implementations.
Reports an error in the operation of the SSL protocol. Normally this indicates a flaw in one of the protocol implementations.
This class extends ServerSockets and provides secure server sockets using protocols such as the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) or Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocols.
Instances of this class are generally created using a SSLServerSocketFactory. The primary function of SSLServerSockets is to create SSLSockets by accepting connections.
SSLServerSockets contain several pieces of state data which are inherited by the SSLSocket at socket creation. These include the enabled cipher suites and protocols, whether client authentication is necessary, and whether created sockets should begin handshaking in client or server mode. The state inherited by the created SSLSocket can be overriden by calling the appropriate methods.
This class extends ServerSockets and provides secure server sockets using protocols such as the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) or Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocols. Instances of this class are generally created using a SSLServerSocketFactory. The primary function of SSLServerSockets is to create SSLSockets by accepting connections. SSLServerSockets contain several pieces of state data which are inherited by the SSLSocket at socket creation. These include the enabled cipher suites and protocols, whether client authentication is necessary, and whether created sockets should begin handshaking in client or server mode. The state inherited by the created SSLSocket can be overriden by calling the appropriate methods.
SSLServerSocketFactorys create SSLServerSockets.
SSLServerSocketFactorys create SSLServerSockets.
In SSL, sessions are used to describe an ongoing relationship between two entities. Each SSL connection involves one session at a time, but that session may be used on many connections between those entities, simultaneously or sequentially. The session used on a connection may also be replaced by a different session. Sessions are created, or rejoined, as part of the SSL handshaking protocol. Sessions may be invalidated due to policies affecting security or resource usage, or by an application explicitly calling invalidate. Session management policies are typically used to tune performance.
In addition to the standard session attributes, SSL sessions expose these read-only attributes:
Peer Identity. Sessions are between a particular
client and a particular server. The identity of the peer may
have been established as part of session setup. Peers are
generally identified by X.509 certificate chains.
Cipher Suite Name. Cipher suites describe the
kind of cryptographic protection that's used by connections
in a particular session.
Peer Host. All connections in a session are
between the same two hosts. The address of the host on the other
side of the connection is available.
Sessions may be explicitly invalidated. Invalidation may also be done implicitly, when faced with certain kinds of errors.
In SSL, sessions are used to describe an ongoing relationship between two entities. Each SSL connection involves one session at a time, but that session may be used on many connections between those entities, simultaneously or sequentially. The session used on a connection may also be replaced by a different session. Sessions are created, or rejoined, as part of the SSL handshaking protocol. Sessions may be invalidated due to policies affecting security or resource usage, or by an application explicitly calling invalidate. Session management policies are typically used to tune performance. In addition to the standard session attributes, SSL sessions expose these read-only attributes: Peer Identity. Sessions are between a particular client and a particular server. The identity of the peer may have been established as part of session setup. Peers are generally identified by X.509 certificate chains. Cipher Suite Name. Cipher suites describe the kind of cryptographic protection that's used by connections in a particular session. Peer Host. All connections in a session are between the same two hosts. The address of the host on the other side of the connection is available. Sessions may be explicitly invalidated. Invalidation may also be done implicitly, when faced with certain kinds of errors.
This event is propagated to a SSLSessionBindingListener. When a listener object is bound or unbound to an SSLSession by SSLSession.putValue(String, Object) or SSLSession.removeValue(String), objects which implement the SSLSessionBindingListener will be receive an event of this type. The event's name field is the key in which the listener is being bound or unbound.
This event is propagated to a SSLSessionBindingListener. When a listener object is bound or unbound to an SSLSession by SSLSession.putValue(String, Object) or SSLSession.removeValue(String), objects which implement the SSLSessionBindingListener will be receive an event of this type. The event's name field is the key in which the listener is being bound or unbound.
This interface is implemented by objects which want to know when they are being bound or unbound from a SSLSession. When either event occurs via SSLSession.putValue(String, Object) or SSLSession.removeValue(String), the event is communicated through a SSLSessionBindingEvent identifying the session.
This interface is implemented by objects which want to know when they are being bound or unbound from a SSLSession. When either event occurs via SSLSession.putValue(String, Object) or SSLSession.removeValue(String), the event is communicated through a SSLSessionBindingEvent identifying the session.
A SSLSessionContext represents a set of SSLSessions associated with a single entity. For example, it could be associated with a server or client who participates in many sessions concurrently.
Not all environments will contain session contexts.
There are SSLSessionContext parameters that affect how sessions are stored:
Sessions can be set to expire after a specified
time limit.
The number of sessions that can be stored in context
can be limited.
A session can be retrieved based on its session id, and all session id's in a SSLSessionContext can be listed.
A SSLSessionContext represents a set of SSLSessions associated with a single entity. For example, it could be associated with a server or client who participates in many sessions concurrently. Not all environments will contain session contexts. There are SSLSessionContext parameters that affect how sessions are stored: Sessions can be set to expire after a specified time limit. The number of sessions that can be stored in context can be limited. A session can be retrieved based on its session id, and all session id's in a SSLSessionContext can be listed.
This class extends Sockets and provides secure socket using protocols such as the "Secure Sockets Layer" (SSL) or IETF "Transport Layer Security" (TLS) protocols.
Such sockets are normal stream sockets, but they add a layer of security protections over the underlying network transport protocol, such as TCP. Those protections include:
Integrity Protection. SSL protects against
modification of messages by an active wiretapper.
Authentication. In most modes, SSL provides
peer authentication. Servers are usually authenticated,
and clients may be authenticated as requested by servers.
Confidentiality (Privacy Protection). In most
modes, SSL encrypts data being sent between client and server.
This protects the confidentiality of data, so that passive
wiretappers won't see sensitive data such as financial
information or personal information of many kinds.
These kinds of protection are specified by a "cipher suite", which is a combination of cryptographic algorithms used by a given SSL connection. During the negotiation process, the two endpoints must agree on a ciphersuite that is available in both environments. If there is no such suite in common, no SSL connection can be established, and no data can be exchanged.
The cipher suite used is established by a negotiation process called "handshaking". The goal of this process is to create or rejoin a "session", which may protect many connections over time. After handshaking has completed, you can access session attributes by using the getSession method. The initial handshake on this connection can be initiated in one of three ways:
calling startHandshake which explicitly
begins handshakes, or
any attempt to read or write application data on
this socket causes an implicit handshake, or
a call to getSession tries to set up a session
if there is no currently valid session, and
an implicit handshake is done.
If handshaking fails for any reason, the SSLSocket is closed, and no further communications can be done.
There are two groups of cipher suites which you will need to know about when managing cipher suites:
Supported cipher suites: all the suites which are
supported by the SSL implementation. This list is reported
using getSupportedCipherSuites.
Enabled cipher suites, which may be fewer
than the full set of supported suites. This group is
set using the setEnabledCipherSuites method, and
queried using the getEnabledCipherSuites method.
Initially, a default set of cipher suites will be enabled on
a new socket that represents the minimum suggested configuration.
Implementation defaults require that only cipher suites which authenticate servers and provide confidentiality be enabled by default. Only if both sides explicitly agree to unauthenticated and/or non-private (unencrypted) communications will such a ciphersuite be selected.
When SSLSockets are first created, no handshaking is done so that applications may first set their communication preferences: what cipher suites to use, whether the socket should be in client or server mode, etc. However, security is always provided by the time that application data is sent over the connection.
You may register to receive event notification of handshake completion. This involves the use of two additional classes. HandshakeCompletedEvent objects are passed to HandshakeCompletedListener instances, which are registered by users of this API.
SSLSockets are created by SSLSocketFactorys, or by accepting a connection from a SSLServerSocket.
A SSL socket must choose to operate in the client or server mode. This will determine who begins the handshaking process, as well as which messages should be sent by each party. Each connection must have one client and one server, or handshaking will not progress properly. Once the initial handshaking has started, a socket can not switch between client and server modes, even when performing renegotiations.
This class extends Sockets and provides secure socket using protocols such as the "Secure Sockets Layer" (SSL) or IETF "Transport Layer Security" (TLS) protocols. Such sockets are normal stream sockets, but they add a layer of security protections over the underlying network transport protocol, such as TCP. Those protections include: Integrity Protection. SSL protects against modification of messages by an active wiretapper. Authentication. In most modes, SSL provides peer authentication. Servers are usually authenticated, and clients may be authenticated as requested by servers. Confidentiality (Privacy Protection). In most modes, SSL encrypts data being sent between client and server. This protects the confidentiality of data, so that passive wiretappers won't see sensitive data such as financial information or personal information of many kinds. These kinds of protection are specified by a "cipher suite", which is a combination of cryptographic algorithms used by a given SSL connection. During the negotiation process, the two endpoints must agree on a ciphersuite that is available in both environments. If there is no such suite in common, no SSL connection can be established, and no data can be exchanged. The cipher suite used is established by a negotiation process called "handshaking". The goal of this process is to create or rejoin a "session", which may protect many connections over time. After handshaking has completed, you can access session attributes by using the getSession method. The initial handshake on this connection can be initiated in one of three ways: calling startHandshake which explicitly begins handshakes, or any attempt to read or write application data on this socket causes an implicit handshake, or a call to getSession tries to set up a session if there is no currently valid session, and an implicit handshake is done. If handshaking fails for any reason, the SSLSocket is closed, and no further communications can be done. There are two groups of cipher suites which you will need to know about when managing cipher suites: Supported cipher suites: all the suites which are supported by the SSL implementation. This list is reported using getSupportedCipherSuites. Enabled cipher suites, which may be fewer than the full set of supported suites. This group is set using the setEnabledCipherSuites method, and queried using the getEnabledCipherSuites method. Initially, a default set of cipher suites will be enabled on a new socket that represents the minimum suggested configuration. Implementation defaults require that only cipher suites which authenticate servers and provide confidentiality be enabled by default. Only if both sides explicitly agree to unauthenticated and/or non-private (unencrypted) communications will such a ciphersuite be selected. When SSLSockets are first created, no handshaking is done so that applications may first set their communication preferences: what cipher suites to use, whether the socket should be in client or server mode, etc. However, security is always provided by the time that application data is sent over the connection. You may register to receive event notification of handshake completion. This involves the use of two additional classes. HandshakeCompletedEvent objects are passed to HandshakeCompletedListener instances, which are registered by users of this API. SSLSockets are created by SSLSocketFactorys, or by accepting a connection from a SSLServerSocket. A SSL socket must choose to operate in the client or server mode. This will determine who begins the handshaking process, as well as which messages should be sent by each party. Each connection must have one client and one server, or handshaking will not progress properly. Once the initial handshaking has started, a socket can not switch between client and server modes, even when performing renegotiations.
SSLSocketFactorys create SSLSockets.
SSLSocketFactorys create SSLSockets.
Standard constants definitions
Standard constants definitions
This is the base interface for JSSE trust managers.
TrustManagers are responsible for managing the trust material that is used when making trust decisions, and for deciding whether credentials presented by a peer should be accepted.
TrustManagers are created by either using a TrustManagerFactory, or by implementing one of the TrustManager subclasses.
This is the base interface for JSSE trust managers. TrustManagers are responsible for managing the trust material that is used when making trust decisions, and for deciding whether credentials presented by a peer should be accepted. TrustManagers are created by either using a TrustManagerFactory, or by implementing one of the TrustManager subclasses.
No vars found in this namespace.
This class acts as a factory for trust managers based on a source of trust material. Each trust manager manages a specific type of trust material for use by secure sockets. The trust material is based on a KeyStore and/or provider specific sources.
This class acts as a factory for trust managers based on a source of trust material. Each trust manager manages a specific type of trust material for use by secure sockets. The trust material is based on a KeyStore and/or provider specific sources.
This class defines the Service Provider Interface (SPI) for the TrustManagerFactory class.
All the abstract methods in this class must be implemented by each cryptographic service provider who wishes to supply the implementation of a particular trust manager factory.
This class defines the Service Provider Interface (SPI) for the TrustManagerFactory class. All the abstract methods in this class must be implemented by each cryptographic service provider who wishes to supply the implementation of a particular trust manager factory.
Abstract class that provides for extension of the X509KeyManager interface.
Methods in this class should be overriden to provide actual implementations.
Abstract class that provides for extension of the X509KeyManager interface. Methods in this class should be overriden to provide actual implementations.
Extensions to the X509TrustManager interface to support SSL/TLS connection sensitive trust management.
To prevent man-in-the-middle attacks, hostname checks can be done to verify that the hostname in an end-entity certificate matches the targeted hostname. TLS does not require such checks, but some protocols over TLS (such as HTTPS) do. In earlier versions of the JDK, the certificate chain checks were done at the SSL/TLS layer, and the hostname verification checks were done at the layer over TLS. This class allows for the checking to be done during a single call to this class.
RFC 2830 defines the server identification specification for the "LDAPS" algorithm. RFC 2818 defines both the server identification and the client identification specification for the "HTTPS" algorithm.
Extensions to the X509TrustManager interface to support SSL/TLS connection sensitive trust management. To prevent man-in-the-middle attacks, hostname checks can be done to verify that the hostname in an end-entity certificate matches the targeted hostname. TLS does not require such checks, but some protocols over TLS (such as HTTPS) do. In earlier versions of the JDK, the certificate chain checks were done at the SSL/TLS layer, and the hostname verification checks were done at the layer over TLS. This class allows for the checking to be done during a single call to this class. RFC 2830 defines the server identification specification for the "LDAPS" algorithm. RFC 2818 defines both the server identification and the client identification specification for the "HTTPS" algorithm.
Instances of this interface manage which X509 certificate-based key pairs are used to authenticate the local side of a secure socket.
During secure socket negotiations, implentations call methods in this interface to:
determine the set of aliases that are available for negotiations based on the criteria presented, select the best alias based on the criteria presented, and obtain the corresponding key material for given aliases.
Note: the X509ExtendedKeyManager should be used in favor of this class.
Instances of this interface manage which X509 certificate-based key pairs are used to authenticate the local side of a secure socket. During secure socket negotiations, implentations call methods in this interface to: determine the set of aliases that are available for negotiations based on the criteria presented, select the best alias based on the criteria presented, and obtain the corresponding key material for given aliases. Note: the X509ExtendedKeyManager should be used in favor of this class.
Instance of this interface manage which X509 certificates may be used to authenticate the remote side of a secure socket. Decisions may be based on trusted certificate authorities, certificate revocation lists, online status checking or other means.
Instance of this interface manage which X509 certificates may be used to authenticate the remote side of a secure socket. Decisions may be based on trusted certificate authorities, certificate revocation lists, online status checking or other means.
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